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Influencing	  trade	  policy	  in	  a	  multi-­‐level	  system	  –	  Understanding	  corporate	  
political	  activity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  value	  chains	  and	  regime	  complexity	  
	  
Louise	  Curran	  (Toulouse	  Business	  School)	  	  
&	  	  
Jappe	  Eckhardt	  (University	  of	  York)	  
	  
Forthcoming	  in	  Business	  and	  Politics	  
	  
ABSTRACT	  	  
The	  increasing	  impact	  of	  the	  international	  trade	  governance	  regime	  on	  the	  domestic	  regulatory	  
sphere	   and	   the	   growing	   inter-­‐linkages	   between	   international	   companies	   through	   their	  
involvement	   in	   global	   value	   chains,	   have	   complicated	   corporate	   political	   activity	   (CPA)	   in	   the	  
trade	   arena	   and	   changed	   the	  way	   companies	   interact	  with	   governments	   in	   this	   context.	   This	  
paper	   draws	   on	   several	   recent	   examples	   of	   novel	   forms	   of	   CPA	   in	   trade	   conflicts	   at	   both	  
multilateral	  and	  regional	  (EU)	  level,	  to	  provide	  an	  updated	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  trade	  policy	  
CPA,	   which	   takes	   account	   of	   the	   increasing	   complexity	   and	   interconnectedness	   in	   the	   world	  
economy.	  We	  highlight,	  in	  particular,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  changing	  context	  means	  that	  ‘domestic’	  
interests	  are	  often	  heterogeneous.	  The	  international	  linkages	  of	  a	  firm	  may	  dictate	  trade	  policy	  
preferences	  more	  than	  its	  nationality.	  In	  addition,	  non-­‐government	  actors	  increasingly	  react	  to	  
globalization	   by	   mobilizing	   transnationally,	   with	   positive	   and	   negative	   impacts	   for	   CPA.	   CPA	  
strategy	  has	  adapted	  to	  that	  reality,	   in	  both	  home	  and	  host	  country	  contexts,	   leading	  to	  novel	  
cross	  border	  alliances	  and	  even	  political	  activity	   in	  countries	  where,	  although	  local	  presence	  is	  
relatively	  low,	  companies	  find	  common	  interests.	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1 Introduction	  
Companies’	   interactions	   with	   their	   non-­‐market	   environment	   have	   attracted	   much	   academic	  
attention	   in	   recent	   decades.	   Baron	   defined	   the	   non-­‐market	   environment	   as	   including	   ‘those	  
interactions	  that	  are	  mediated	  by	  the	  public,	  stakeholders,	  government,	   the	  media	  and	  public	  
institutions.’
1
	   He	   argued	   that	   the	   effective	   integration	   of	   market	   strategy	   with	   non-­‐market	  
strategy	   (NMS)	   optimized	   firm	   performance.	   Since	   then	   the	   field	   of	   research	   on	   NMS	   has	  
evolved	  considerably.	  A	  key	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  has	  been	  on	  Corporate	  Political	  Activity	  (CPA),	  
which	  explores	   interactions	  with	  government	  and	  public	   institutions	   i.e.	   ‘…corporate	  attempts	  
to	  shape	  government	  policy	  in	  ways	  favorable	  to	  the	  firm.’
2
	  Much	  work	  on	  CPA	  has	  focused	  on	  
trade	  policy,	  which	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  pivotal	  public	  policy	  affecting	  business.
3
	  One	  of	  the	  
key	  contributions	  is	  Baron’s	  own	  work.	  In	  particular	  his	  conceptual	  framework	  on	  trade	  policy-­‐
making	  ,	  and	  the	  work	  based	  on	  it,	  has	  been	  highly	  influential	  in	  theory	  building	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
CPA.
4
	  	  
The	  other	  key	  NMS	  research	  stream	  explores	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	   (CSR),	  defined	  as	  
‘…context-­‐specific	   organizational	   actions	   and	   policies	   that	   take	   into	   account	   stakeholders’	  
expectations	  and	  the	  triple	  bottom	  line	  of	  economic,	  social,	  and	  environmental	  performance.’
5
	  
This	   research	  has	   tended	   to	   focus	  more	  on	   interactions	  with	   the	  public,	   stakeholders	  and	   the	  
media.
6
	   Several	   scholars	   have	   recently	   called	   for	   a	   more	   effective	   integration	   of	   these	   two	  
streams,	  which	  have	  developed	  rather	  independently	  of	  each	  other
7
.	  	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  CPA	  aspect	  of	  NMS,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  trade	  policy.	  
Since	   Baron	   published	   his	   seminal	   work,	   the	   range	   of	   issues	   covered	   by	   trade	   policy	   has	  
expanded,	  making	  it	  pertinent	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  business	  and	  non-­‐business	  interests.
8
	  At	  the	  
same	   time,	   globalization	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   global	   value	   chains	   (GVCs)	   have	   changed	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
	  Baron,	  1995	  p.47	  
2
	  Hillman	  et.	  al.,	  1995	  
3
	  Baron	  1995,	  1997;	  Vogel	  1996.	  
4
	  Baron	  1995,	  1997	  
5
	  Aguinis	  and	  Glavas,	  2012.	  
6
	  See	  Frynas	  and	  Stephens	  2015	  and	  Scherer	  et	  al	  2016	  for	  recent	  reviews	  
7
	  Den	  Hond	  et.	  al.	  2014;	  Lock	  and	  Seele,	  2016.	  
8
	  Woll	  and	  Artigas,	  2007	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nature	  of	  linkages	  both	  between	  and	  within	  firms	  and	  with	  their	  home	  and	  host	  governments,	  
as	  well	  as	  encouraging	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs)	  to	  militate	  at	  the	  international	  
level.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  different	  factors	  CPA	  in	  the	  trade	  arena	  has	  changed	  significantly.	  Yet	  
Baron’s	   trade	   policy-­‐making	   conceptual	   framework	   and	   the	   work	   based	   on	   it,	   has	   not	   been	  
revisited	   to	   take	   account	   of	   these	   evolutions.	   In	   this	   paper	   we	   will	   argue	   that	   some	   of	   the	  
assumptions	   behind	   Baron’s	   framework	   	   now	   require	   revision.	   We	   focus	   on	   the	   following	  
question:	  how	  have	  the	  globalization	  of	  value	  chains	  and	  increasing	  coverage	  and	  complexity	  in	  
international	   trade	  governance	   impacted	  on	  CPA	   in	   the	   trade	  policy	   	  arena?	   In	  answering	   this	  
question,	   we	   develop	   a	   modified	   conceptual	   framework	   of	   CPA	   and	   trade	   policy,	   which	  
integrates	   today’s	  more	  global	  and	  complex	  context	   in	   terms	  of	  production,	   stakeholders	  and	  
trade	  governance.	  	  
Our	  modified	   framework	  will	   integrate	   two	   important	  evolutions,	  which	  are	  absent	   in	  Baron’s	  	  
conceptualisation	  and	  most	  of	   the	  work	  building	  on	   it.	   Firstly,	   the	  globalisation	  of	  production	  
structures	   and	   trade	   governance	   and	   the	   subsequent	   emergence	   of	   transnational	   and	  
multilateral	  lobbying	  and	  secondly,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena	  beyond	  classic	  trade	  
issues	  and	  traditional	  company	  actors.	  	  
In	   terms	  of	   the	   first	  evolution	  –	  globalisation	   -­‐	  most	  existing	  work	  on	  CPA	  and	   trade	  policy	   is	  
based	  on	  a	  classic	  two	  country:	  two	  industry	  model	  (in	  Baron’s	  case,	  US/Japan:	  Kodak/Fujifilm),	  
with	  lobbying	  focused	  on	  the	  home	  country	  and	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  Baron	  acknowledged	  
that	  the	  ‘home’	  country	  of	  company	  headquarters	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  perspective	  and	  that	  the	  
‘rent	   chain’	   might	   be	   a	   better	   lens	   to	   view	   the	   likely	   political	   influence	   of	   a	   company.
9
	   This	  
concept	   of	  mobilizing	   the	   rent	   chain	   for	  more	   effective	  CPA	  was	   further	   developed	   in	   a	   later	  
paper,	  where	  he	  noted:	   ‘In	   addition	   to	   sharing	   the	   cost	  of	  nonmarket	   strategy	  more	  broadly,	  
rent	   chain	   mobilization	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   coverage	   a	   firm	   or	   coalition	   can	   generate.’
10
	  
However,	  he	  did	  not	  incorporate	  international	  activity	  into	  his	  framework,	  where	  policy-­‐making	  
remains	  essentially	  domestic	  –	   the	  coverage	  of	  a	   rent	  chain	  coalition	  was	  defined	   in	   terms	  of	  
number	  of	  (US)	  legislative	  districts	  mobilized.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  global	  production	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9
	  Baron	  1997:	  p.158	  
10
	  Baron	  1999	  :	  p.	  22	  emphasis	  in	  original	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networks	  has	  considerably	  expanded	   the	  potential	   for	   interest	  mobilization	  beyond	   the	  home	  
country.In	  the	  Kodak/Fuji	  case,	  the	  rent	  chain	  and	  the	  home	  country	  coincided,	  a	  situation	  that	  
was	  common	  at	  the	  time.	  However	  in	  recent	  years	  we	  have	  seen	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  Multi	  
National	   Enterprises	   (MNEs)	   undertaking	   CPA	   outside	   of	   their	   home	   country,	   in	   response	   to	  
threats	  and	  opportunities	  along	  their	  ‘rent	  chain’.	  	  
In	  addition,	  another	   factor	  anticipated	   in	  Baron’s	  work	  –	   the	  growing	   importance	  of	  action	  at	  
the	  multilateral	  (the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  [WTO])	  rather	  than	  the	  bilateral	  level
11
	  –	  has	  also	  
become	  much	  more	  generalized	  in	  CPA.	  Particularly	  since	  with	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  WTO	  in	  1995	  
and	  the	  establishment	  therein	  of	  a	  more	  effective	  and	  binding	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  (DSB).	  
We	  argue	   that	   	   the	   internationalization	  of	  both	  production	  and	   trade	  governance	  need	   to	  be	  
more	  effectively	  integrated	  into	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  companies	  interact	  with	  the	  political	  
process	  through	  their	  nonmarket	  strategies.	  	  
The	   second	   important	   evolution	   which	   we	   highlight	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   how	   ‘trade’	   policy	   has	  
expanded	  well	  beyond	  classic	  ‘trade’	  issues	  and	  now	  involves	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  actors.
12
	  As	  
Vogel
	  
pointed	   out	   in	   1996,
13
	   CPA	   expanded	   because	   the	   government’s	   role	   in	   the	   economy	  
increasingly	  incorporated	  issues	  with	  direct	  impacts	  on	  companies’	  business	  models,	  like	  health,	  
safety	   and	   environmental	   protection.	   Since	   then,	   the	   trade	   policy	   remit	   has	   itself	   expanded,	  
Increasingly	  the	  DSB	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  rule	  on	  domestic	  regulation	  on	  precisely	  the	  issues	  Vogel	  
highlights,	  in	  view	  of	  their	  links	  to	  trade.	  There	  is	  now	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  jurisprudence	  from	  the	  
WTO	  DSB	  relating	   to	   the	  compatibility	  of	  national	   regulation	  on	  key	   issues	   like	  environmental	  
protection	   and	   public	   health	  with	  member	   states’	  WTO	   commitments.	   This	   has	  widened	   the	  
trade	  policy	   remit,	  but	  also	   increased	   its	   relevance	  to	  civil	   society	  actors,	  who	  have	  expanded	  
their	   transnational	   advocacy.
14
	   Given	   their	   potential	   to	   impact	   on	   national	   governments’	  
legislative	  autonomy,	  WTO	  judgments	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  extensive	  scrutiny	  by	  academics	  and	  
civil	   society.
15
	   Thus	   in	   tandem	   with	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   domestic	   political	   agenda	   affecting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11
	  Baron	  1997:	  p.164	  
12
	  Woll	  and	  Artigas,	  2007	  
13
	  Vogel	  1996	  
14
	  Betzold	  2014;	  Eilstrup-­‐Sangiovanni	  and	  Phelps	  Bondaroff	  2014;	  Mukherjee	  and	  Ekanayake	  2009;	  Rietig	  2016.	  
15
	  e.g.	  Howse	  and	  Levy	  2013;	  Read	  2005;	  Vogel	  2013;	  Davis,	  2009.	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business,	  that	  same	  agenda	  has	  increasingly	  been	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  by	  the	  international	  trade	  
regime,	  bringing	  trade	  policy	  once	  more	  center	  stage	  in	  terms	  of	  MNEs’	  concerns	  and	  providing	  
multi-­‐level	  arenas	  for	  CPA	  on	  regulatory	  issues.
16
	  	  
Empirically,	  this	  paper	  draws	  on	  analyses	  of	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  trade	  disputes	  at	  multilateral	  and	  
regional	  level,	  which	  highlight	  how	  globalization,	  GVCs	  (as	  ‘rent	  chains’	  are	  now	  more	  commonly	  
termed)	  and	  increasing	  regime	  complexity	  have	  changed	  the	  CPA	  strategies	  of	  MNEs.	  Based	  on	  
these	   analyses,	   we	   propose	   a	   revised	   model	   of	   international	   CPA	   in	   the	   trade	   policy	   arena,	  
which	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  evolutions	  which	  we	  identify.	  Our	  focus	  is	  on	  trade	  policymaking,	  
however	  the	  important	  characteristics	  which	  we	  identify	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  CPA	  
more	  widely,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  NMS.	  For	  example	  in	  the	  area	  of	  CSR,	  recent	  research	  
has	  highlighted	  how	  the	  rise	  of	  international	  NGO	  movements	  and	  extensive	  networks	  between	  
stakeholders,	  has	   forced	  companies	   to	  adapt	   their	   strategies.
17
	   In	  addition,	   the	  evolutions	  we	  
highlight	   –	   i.e.	   the	   growing	   influence	   of	   NGOs	   in	   regulatory	   debates,	   the	   variety	   of	   interests	  
within	  domestic	   industry	  and	  the	  potential	   for	  companies	  to	  engage	   in	  multi-­‐level	  CPA	  –	  have	  
the	  potential	  to	  impact	  on	  CPA	  in	  many	  different	  issue	  areas,	  from	  environmental	  protection	  to	  
taxation	   policy.	   Our	   objective	   therefore,	   is	   to	   contribute,	   not	   only	   to	   analysis	   of	   trade	   policy	  
making,	   but	   also	   our	  wider	   understanding	   of	   how	   CPA	   is	   adapting	   to	   a	  more	   integrated	   and	  
multi-­‐level	  global	  context.	  
	  
2 Research	  on	  CPA	  in	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena	   	  
Research	  on	  CPA	   is	   extensive	  and	  growing.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	   several	   scholars,	  CPA	   literature	  
does	   not	   rest	   on	   a	   single	   unique	   theory.	   Rather	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   theoretical	   lenses	   and	  
methodological	   approaches	   have	   been	   used	   to	   interpret	   firms’	   political	   behavior.
18
	   Our	  
objective	  is	  not	  to	  summarize	  this	  wide	  body	  of	  work.	  	  There	  are	  several	  recent	  comprehensive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16
	  Woll	  and	  Artigas,	  2007.	  
17
	  Lucea	  and	  Doh	  2012.	  
18
	  Doh	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Hillman	  et	  al,	  2994	  ;	  Lawton	  et	  al.	  2013	  ;	  Shaffer,	  1995	  ;	  Mellahi	  et.	  al.	  2016	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reviews	   of	   the	   literature.
19
	   They	   highlight	   that	   existing	   research	   has	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	  why	  
firms	  engage	  in	  CPA	  and	  whether	  it	  affects	  performance,
20
	  as	  well	  as	  understanding	  the	  context	  
of	  CPA,	  especially	  the	  impact	  of	  institutions.
21
	  Our	  focus	  is	  less	  on	  the	  former	  questions	  of	  the	  
antecedents	  and	  outcomes	  of	  CPA,	  than	  on	  the	  latter,	  of	  how	  to	  better	  understand	  its	  evolution	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  shifting	  institutional	  contexts.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  different	  models	  and	  typologies	  presented	  in	  the	  literature,
22
	  our	  objective	  is	  to	  
contribute	   to	   understanding	   the	   interaction	   between	   CPA	   and	   firms’	   evolving	   institutional	  
context,	   specifically	   the	  work	  which	   Lawton	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	   identify	   as	   seeking	   to	   ‘…help	  
explain	  the	  process	  of	  change	  and	  adaptation	  of	  CPA	  in	  the	  context	  of	  globalization…’
23
	  As	  their	  
review	   highlights,	   much	   of	   the	   work	   in	   this	   research	   stream	   has	   looked	   at	   CPA	   in	   emerging	  
markets	  and	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  The	  potential	  for	  multilateral	  trade	  liberalization	  
to	  change	  government	  business	  relations	  is	  noted	  in	  their	  review,	  however	  work	  in	  the	  area	  was	  
little	  explored.
24
	   	   This	   is	  unfortunate,	  as	  CPA	  needs	   to	  adapt,	  not	   just	   to	   the	   rise	  of	  emerging	  
markets,	   but	   also	   to	   the	  expansion	  of	  GVCs	   and	  global	   governance.	   Several	   existing	   analyses,	  
which	  we	  will	  draw	  on	  in	  this	  paper,	  	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  this	  process	  of	  change.	  	  
This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  better	  integrate	  these	  insights	  into	  our	  understanding	  of	  CPA.
25
	  	  
The	   aforementioned	   work	   by	   Baron
26
,	   is	   of	   course	   a	   seminal	   contribution	   to	   existing	  
understanding	  of	  CPA.	  	  It	  has	  been	  very	  influential	  in	  theory	  building	  .	  His	  work	  draws	  heavily	  on	  
cases	   of	   company	   CPA	   (mainly	   in	   the	   US)	   related	   to	   trade	   policy,	   or	   intergovernmental	  
negotiations.
27
	   	  Baron’s	  work	  generated	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	  literature.	  Much	  of	  this	  research	  
has	   focused	   on:	   a)	   the	   domestic	   context,	   analyzing	   how	   companies	   seek	   to	   influence	   their	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  Shaffer,	  1995;	  Hillman	  et.	  al.	  2004;	  Lawton,	  McGuire	  and	  Rajwani	  2013;	  Lux,	  Crook	  and	  Woehr	  2011;	  Mellahi	  et	  
al,	  2016.	  
20
	  Hillman	  et.	  al.	  2004;	  Lux,	  Crook	  and	  Woehr,	  2011;	  Mellahi	  et	  al,	  2016.	  
21
	  Doh,	  Lawton	  and	  Rajwani,	  2012;	  Lawton,	  McGuire	  and	  Rajwani	  2013;	  	  
22
	  Doh	  et	  al,	  2012	  ;	  Hillman	  et	  al,	  2004	  ;	  Lawton	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Mellahi	  et.	  al.	  (2016)	  
23
	  Lawton	  et	  al,	  2013	  :	  93.	  
24
	  The	  only	  paper	  referenced	  in	  Lawton	  et	  al’s	  (2013)	  review,	  is	  one	  on	  how	  WTO	  membership	  transformed	  
government	  business	  relations	  in	  Brazil:	  Shaffer,	  Ratton	  Sanchez	  and	  Rosenberg,	  2007.	  
25
	  Doh,	  McGuire	  and	  Ozaki,	  2015	  ;	  Davis	  2009;	  Lawton	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Shaffer,	  2003.	  
26
	  Baron	  1995,	  1997.	  
27
	  These	  are,	  in	  Baron	  (1995)	  the	  Cemex	  antidumping	  case,	  Toy’R’Us	  lobbying	  of	  the	  government	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  
Japan	  to	  revise	  regulations	  on	  retailing	  and	  in	  Baron	  (1997),	  Kodak’s	  filing	  of	  a	  Section	  301	  case	  in	  the	  US	  to	  force	  
the	  government	  to	  address	  restrictions	  on	  their	  market	  access	  in	  Japan.	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government;
28
	   b)	   the	   factors	   which	   affect	   such	   influence;
29
	   and	   c)	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐business	  
groups	  in	  counteracting	  business	  led	  CPA.
30
	   	  However,	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  CPA	  in	  
the	  trade	  arena	  has	  evolved	  considerably	  since	  Baron’s	  early	  conceptualisation	  and	  that	  a	  wider	  
set	  of	  factors	  need	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  our	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  CPA	  in	  this	  arena.	  
Firstly,	  most	  existing	  work	  views	  trade	  lobbying	  as	  an	  internal	  domestic	  activity,	  where	  a	  given	  
government’s	   political	   choices	   are	   the	   result	   of	   lobbying	   by	   domestic	   political	   actors.
31
	   The	  
conventional	  view	  is	  that	   import-­‐competing	  firms	   lobby	  domestically	  for	  protectionist	  policies,	  
while	   exporters	   encourage	   domestic	   decision	   makers	   to	   negotiate	   trade	   deals	   that	   increase	  
access	   to	   foreign	   markets.
32
	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   assumption	   is	   that	   independent,	   domestic	  
based	   company	   lobbying	   is	   the	   norm	   in	   the	   trade	   arena.	   A	   lack	   of	   trust	   is	   assumed	   to	   exist	  
across	  companies	  and,	  even	  more	  so,	  across	  borders,	  which	  precludes	  cooperative	  CPA	  beyond	  
a	   limited	   sectoral	   or	   local	   group
33
.	   The	   global	   expansion	   of	   MNEs	   economic	   activities	   has	  
modified	  the	  incentives	  for	  lobbying	  across	  companies,	  countries	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Through	  
their	   	   geographically	   dispersed	   investment	   and	   sourcing,	   MNEs	   now	   have	   extensive	   political	  
leverage	   with	   host	   governments.	   In	   addition	   their	   activities	   have	   impacts	   on	   sustainable	  
development,	  which	  NGOs	  may	  support	  or	  challenge.	  They	  can	  therefore	  create	  alliances	  across	  
a	  wider	  range	  of	  actors	  with	  shared	  strategic	  interests,	  many	  of	  whom	  may	  be	  ‘foreign’.	  	  
Secondly,	   and	   related	   to	   our	   first	   point,	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   GVCs	   complicates	   the	  
concept	  of	  company	  and	  national	   interests,	  with	  effects	  on	  the	   instigators	  and	  targets	  of	  CPA.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  Baron	  was	  developing	  his	   ideas	  on	  trade	  policy-­‐making,	  Gary	  Gereffi	  was	  
starting	  what	  was	  to	  become	  a	  wide	  and	  rich	  research	  stream	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  GVCs.
34
	  It	  is	  
now	  well	  accepted	  that	  “[t]he	  fragmentation	  of	  production	  across	  [GVCs]	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
foreign	   inputs	   in	  virtually	  all	  sectors,”
35
	  have	  become	  a	  dominant	  economic	  reality	   in	  the	  21st	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  e.g.	  Brook,	  2005;	  Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  2010;	  Solis,	  2013;	  Thacker	  2000.	  	  
29
	  e.g.	  Hillman,	  Long	  and	  Soubeyran,	  2001;	  Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  2010;	  Schuler	  and	  Rehbein	  2011;	  Solis,	  2013.	  
30
	  e.g.	  Farrand	  2015;	  Schnietz	  and	  Nieman	  1999.	  
31
	  See,	  for	  example,	  Schnietz	  and	  Nieman	  1999	  on	  lobbying	  around	  the	  US	  Fast	  Track	  Authority	  and	  Brook	  2005	  on	  
US	  steel	  sector	  lobbying.	  
32
	  Dur	  2010;	  Friedan	  and	  Rogowski	  1996;	  Goldstein	  and	  Martin	  2000.	  
33
	  Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  2002	  p.149	  	  
34
	  Gereffi	  1995;	  Gereffi	  1999;	  Gereffi,	  Humphrey	  and	  Sturgeon	  2005.	  
35
	  Taglioni	  and	  Winkler	  2014:	  p.	  XV	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century.	   We	   argue	   that,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   globalization	   of	   production	   systems,	   the	  
aforementioned	   traditional	   model	   of	   trade	   policy	   as	   a	   political	   battle	   between	   import-­‐
competitors	   and	   exporters,	   is	   no	   longer	   generalised.	   GVCs	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   the	   political	  
mobilization	   and	   empowerment	   of	   a	   wider	   set	   of	   societal	   interests.	   In	   particular	   ‘import	  
dependent	  firms’	  (IDFs),	  	  defined	  as:	  “…those	  which	  rely	  on	  income	  created	  by	  imported	  goods	  
or	   on	   the	   import	   of	   intermediate	   products	   for	   their	   production	   process,”
36
	   have	   increasingly	  
become	  politically	  active	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  This	  trend	  for	  consuming	  industries	  to	  mobilize	  
and	  defend	  their	  preferences	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  	  was	  already	  evident	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  this	  
century,	  when	  car	  manufacturers	  complained	  of	  the	  negative	  impacts	  of	  anti-­‐dumping	  action	  on	  
steel	   imports.
37
	  However,	   as	  we	  will	   demonstrate	  below,	   there	  are	  now	   several	   recent	   cases,	  
where	  CPA	  by	  import-­‐dependent	  firms	  has	  been	  more	  pro-­‐active	  and	  organized.	  
In	  addition,	  GVCs	  have	  increasingly	  been	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  and	  activism	  by	  civil	  society	  actors	  
in	   relation	   to	   their	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	   and	   potential	   to	   undermine	   labor	   standards,	  
especially	   in	   developing	   countries	   .
38
	   Much	   transnational	   NGO	   advocacy	   has	   focused	   on	  
environmental	   policy.
39
	   However,	   civil	   society	   has	   also	   been	   active	   in	   the	   trade	   policy	   arena,	  
both	   in	  mobilizing	  against	  MNEs,	  when	   interests	  are	   seen	   to	  be	  divergent
40
	   and	  working	  with	  
them,	   especially	   in	   pursuit	   of	   protection	   to	   safeguard	   employment.
41
	   We	   argue	   that	   the	  
expansion	  of	  GVCs	  and	  the	  increasing	  power	  of	  multilateral	  institutions	  have	  encouraged	  NGOs,	  
like	  MNEs,	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  domestic	  arena	  and	  militate	  transnationally,	  with	  corresponding	  
impacts	  on	  trade	  policy.	  
Thirdly,	  existing	  analysis	  of	  transnational	  lobbying	  (i.e.	  firms	  lobbying	  a	  foreign	  government)	  in	  
the	   trade	   policy	   context,	   has	   tended	   to	   assume,	   rather	   intuitively,	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   that	  
lobbying	  would	  be	  market	  opening	  in	  the	  lobbied	  state.	  For	  example,	  research	  has	  found	  foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36
	  Eckhardt	  2013:	  p.990.	  
37
	  Brook	  2005.	  
38
	  Bair	  and	  Palpacuer	  2012;	  Doh	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Plank,	  Staritz	  and	  Lucas	  2009.	  
39
	  Betzold	  2014;	  Eilstrup-­‐Sangiovanni	  and	  Phelps	  Bondaroff	  2014;	  Rietig	  2016.	  
40
	  See	  Schnietz	  and	  Nieman	  1999	  on	  the	  role	  of	  environmental	  and	  labour	  activists	  in	  the	  successful	  campaign	  to	  
deny	  fast	  track	  authority	  to	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  
41
	  See	  Brook	  2005	  on	  the	  role	  of	  labour	  unions	  in	  a	  successful	  campaign	  to	  protect	  the	  US	  steel	  industry.	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firms	   to	   be	   active	   in	   lobbying	  US	   policy	  makers	   to	   lower	   barriers	   in	   their	   domestic	  market,
42
	  
while	   empirical	   analysis	   has	   found	   a	   correlation	   between	   lobbying	   by	   foreign	   companies	   and	  
lower	   barriers	   to	   related	   imports.
43
	   Foreign	   lobbyists,	   like	   their	   domestic	   equivalents,	   are	  
assumed	  to	  be	  seeking	  domestic	  policy	  change,	  especially	   lower	   import	   tariffs.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  will	  
highlight	  below,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  The	  fact	  that	  international	  trade	  dispute	  settlement	  
procedures	   are	   inter-­‐state	  means	   that	   any	   state	   can	   bring	   a	   case	   against	   another	   state,	   but	  
companies	  cannot	  pursue	  states	  at	  the	  WTO.	  Thus	  corporate	  access	  to	  the	  DSB	  depends	  on	  the	  
company’s	  capacity	  to	  persuade	  a	  state	  to	  take	  a	  case.
44
	  This	  institutional	  reality	  opens	  another	  
avenue	  for	  CPA,	  which	  is	  quite	  distinct	  from	  the	  domestic	  policy	  space	  and	  narrow	  tariff-­‐related	  
trade	  interests.	  
Finally,	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   stronger	   multilevel	   governance	   system	   within	   the	   WTO	   both	  
expands	  the	  reach	  of	  ‘trade’	  policy	  beyond	  classic	  ‘trade’	  issues	  and	  increases	  regime	  complexity	  
in	   the	  area.
45
	   The	  WTO	  and	   its	  DSB	   in	  particular,	  provides	  a	  new	   level	  of	  policy-­‐making,	  or	  at	  
least	  policy	  oversight	  of	  domestic	  policy.	  This	  opens	  the	  possibility	  for	  company	  agency	  on	  trade	  
policy	  well	  beyond	  the	  classic	  issues	  of	  domestic	  market	  protection	  or	  foreign	  market	  opening.	  
In	  addition,	  as	  tariffs	  have	  fallen	  over	  time,	  barriers	  to	  trade	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  emanate	  from	  
‘behind	  the	  border	  issues’	  of	  domestic	  regulation,
46
	  which	  have	  increasingly	  been	  challenged	  in	  
the	  DSB.
47
	  Disputes	  have	  covered	  regulations	  seeking	  to	  protect	  specific	  species	  like	  sea	  turtles,	  
dolphins	  and	   seals,	   as	  well	   as	   consumers	  and	   the	  environment.
48
	   Thus	  WTO	   law	  has	   come	   to	  
impact	  on	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  sectors	  across	  its	  member	  states.	  	  This	  development	  provides	  a	  
new	  option	  for	  MNEs	  CPA	  	  seeking	  regulatory	  change.
49
	  In	  this	  context	  the	  national	  level	  may	  no	  
longer	  be	  the	  most	  appropriate	  or	  most	  efficient	  arena	  to	  challenge	  domestic	  regulation.
50
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  Olarreaga	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  2007.	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  2009:	  p.11	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  Davis,	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3	   Research	  question	  and	  approach	  
As	   indicated	   in	   the	   introduction,	   our	   key	   research	   question	   is	   ‘How	  have	   the	   globalization	   of	  
value	   chains	   and	   increasing	   coverage	   and	   complexity	   in	   international	   trade	   governance	  
impacted	  on	  CPA	  in	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena?’	  Specifically	  we	  seek	  to	  draw	  on	  analyses	  of	  CPA	  in	  
recent	   trade	   disputes	   to	   highlight	   how	   company	   strategy	   has	   responded	   to	   these	   joint	  
institutional	  evolutions.	  Building	  on	  these	  findings	  we	  propose	  a	  revised	  conceptual	  framework	  
of	   trade	   policy	  We	   chose	   four	   cases	   to	   inform	   our	   analysis,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   two	   key	   criteria.	  
Firstly	   that	   some	  or	   all	   of	   the	  novel	   elements	  which	  we	  highlight	   above	   can	  be	   seen	   to	  have	  
influenced	  company	  strategy	  and	  secondly	  that	  they	  were	  high	  profile	  and	  therefore	  relatively	  
well	  documented,	  both	  by	  the	  media	  and,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  very	  recent	  Plain	  Packaging	  
case,	  academic	  researchers
51
.	  We	  look	  at	  the	  following	  disputes:	  the	  WTO	  challenge	  by	  Antigua	  
of	  US	  online	  gambling	  legislation,	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  -­‐China	  conflict	  on	  anti-­‐dumping	  (AD)	  
action	   in	   footwear,	   the	   EU-­‐China	   solar	   panel	   AD	   conflict	   and	   the	   WTO	   challenge	   by	   five	  
countries	  to	  Australia’s	  plain	  packaging	  legislation	  for	  tobacco	  products.	  	  	  
This	  paper	  is	  a	  conceptual	  paper	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  secondary	  data.	  However,	  one	  
or	   both	   authors	   have	   undertaken	   primary	   research	   on	   all	   of	   the	   cases	   covered	   in	   this	   paper,	  
including	   interviews	  with	  the	  key	  actors,	  which	   inform	  our	  analysis.	  We	  are	  well	  aware	  of	   the	  
difficulties	  of	  generalizing	  from	  case	  studies,	  however	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  scholars	  consider	  
that	   social	   sciences	   have	   become	   too	   reliant	   on	   quantitative	   research	   and	   have	   argued	   that	  
qualitative	   case	   studies	   can	   provide	   useful	   insights	   for	   theory	   building
52
.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   first	  
attempts	  to	  summarize	  CPA	  literature,	  Shaffer	  noted	  that	  case	  studies	  had	  provided	  important	  
contributions	   and	   defended	   their	   importance:	   ‘As	   a	   research	   problem,	   political	   influence	  
activities	   may	   be	   particularly	   hard	   to	   describe	   using	   statistical	   methods’
53
.	   Indeed	   many	  
important	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  CPA	  have	  drawn	  on	  case	  study	  evidence
54
,	  not	  least	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51
	  Due	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  existing	  research,	  the	  section	  which	  explores	  this	  latter	  case	  is	  slightly	  longer	  than	  the	  other	  
three.	  
52
	  George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005	  
53
	  Shaffer,	  1995:	  509.	  
54
	  For	  example:	  Eckhardt	  and	  de	  Bievre	  2015;	  Lawton	  et	  al,	  2009	  ;	  Lucea	  and	  Doh,	  2012;	  Shaffer	  and	  Hillman,	  2000	  ;	  
Kingsley,	  Vanden	  Bergh	  and	  Bonardi,	  2012.	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Baron’s	  own	  work.
55
	  Our	  aim	  is	  to	  build	  a	  new	  conceptual	  framework,	  by	  generating	  plausible	  
propositions	  based	  on	  case	  study	  evidence,	  ‘which	  do	  not	  make	  sense	  when	  viewed	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  an	  initial	  theoretical	  framework.’
	  56
	  	  This	  approach,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  abductive	  reasoning,	  
is	  a	  well-­‐accepted	  basis	  for	  theory-­‐building	  from	  case	  studies.
57
	  	  	  
4	  	   Evolving	   towards	   more	   complex	   and	   transnational	   policy-­‐making	   –	   some	   empirical	  
examples	  of	  changing	  patterns	  of	  CPA	  
This	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  four	  chosen	  cases	  of	  trade	  conflicts.	  To	  put	  them	  into	  context,	  we	  
will	  briefly	  highlight	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  Kodak-­‐Fuji	  case	  on	  which	  Baron’s	  framework	  was	  
based.	   The	   core	   of	   that	   case	   was	   the	   alleged	   tolerance	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   practices	   in	   the	  
Japanese	  market,	  which	  restricted	  Kodak’s	  market	  access,	  enabling	  Fujifilm	  to	  make	  abnormal	  
profits,	  with	  which	  they	  subsidized	  sales	  elsewhere.	  Kodak	  chose	  to	  challenge	  these	  practices,	  
not	   in	  Japan,	  where	   it	  had	   little	  political	   influence,	  but	   in	   its	  home	  country,	   the	  US,	  through	  a	  
Section	   301	   market	   opening	   petition.	   The	   US	   administration	   ruled	   in	   favor	   of	   Kodak	   and	  
subsequently	  complained	  about	  Japan’s	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  in	  the	  WTO.	  Kodak’s	  CPA	  in	  
the	   case	  was	  multifaceted	  and	  extensive,	  but	  essentially	  domestic.	  Although	   they	  did	   seek	   to	  
undertake	  CPA	  in	  Japan,	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  little	  impact.
58
	  
Antigua-­‐US	  gambling	  
In	   2001,	   the	   US	   introduced	   several	   state	   and	   federal	   laws	   to	   severely	   restrict	   online	   sports	  
betting.	  Under	  the	  new	  rules,	   it	  was	  prohibited	  for	  firms	  (partly)	  based	  in	  other	  WTO	  member	  
states	   to	  provide	   cross-­‐border	  betting	   services	   to	  US	   customers.	  However,	  betting	  offered	  on	  
horse	  races	  by	  fully	  US	  based	  companies	  and	  online	  lotteries	  in	  some	  US	  states	  remained	  legal.	  
In	  2003,	  Antigua	  and	  Barbuda	  –	  a	  small	  twin-­‐island	  state	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Caribbean	  –	  brought	  a	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  Baron,	  1995;	  1997	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  Andersen	  and	  Hanne,	  2010:	  52.	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  See	  e.g.	  Andersen	  and	  Hanne,	  2010;	  Reichertz,	  2004.	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  1997	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WTO	  DS	   case	   against	   the	   US,	   alleging	   that	   the	   new	  US	   betting	   laws	  were	   in	   violation	   of	   the	  
principle	  of	  “national	  treatment”	  and	  hence	  WTO-­‐incompatible.
59
	  	  
The	   case	   is	   interesting	   in	   light	   of	   our	   paper	   because	   of	   the	   key	   role	   of	   MNEs	   and	   their	  
transnational	  lobbying	  activities.	  Small	  less	  developed	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  involved	  in	  this	  
case,	   rarely	   use	   the	  DSB,	   given	   the	  high	   costs	   of	  WTO	   litigation.
60
	   Therefore,	   external	   factors	  
seemed	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  play	   	  and,	   indeed,	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  transnational	   lobbying	  by	  a	  
group	  of	  US	  online	  betting	  firms	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	   in	  Antigua’s	  decision	  to	  bring	  the	  WTO	  
case.
61
	  Their	  choice	  of	  to	  lobby	  a	  third	  country	  government	  to	  challenge	  legislation	  in	  the	  WTO	  
was	  unusual.	  As	  indicated	  earlier,	  litigation	  in	  the	  WTO	  has	  typically	  been	  the	  result	  of	  domestic	  
lobbying	   by	   powerful	   import-­‐competing	   industries	   seeking	   protection	   from	   their	   home	  
government
62
	  or	  large	  domestic	  exporting	  firms	  seeking	  secure	  access	  to	  foreign	  markets.
63
	  The	  
political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  Antigua-­‐US	  gambling	  case	  were	  very	  different.	  	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  attracted	  by	  the	  supportive	  institutional	  environment	  in	  Antigua,	  many	  
US	   online	   betting	   firms	   had	   moved	   (part	   of)	   their	   operations	   there	   to	   serve	   their	   American	  
customers.	  .	  When	  the	  US	  introduced	  its	  protectionist	  gambling	  laws	  in	  2001,	  fifty	  of	  these	  firms	  
formed	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	   interest	  group	  –	  the	  Antigua	  Online	  Gaming	  Association	  (AOGA)	  based	   in	  El	  
Paso,	   Texas	   –	   and	   engaged	   in	   an	   intensive	   lobbying	   campaign	   to	   convince	   the	   Antiguan	  
authorities	   to	   file	   a	  WTO	   case.
64
	   There	   is	   strong	   evidence	   that	   the	   lobbying	   efforts	   of	   AOGA	  
were	  crucial	  in	  persuading	  the	  government	  to	  bring	  the	  case.	  In	  addition	  it	  has	  been	  confirmed	  
that	  AOGA	  paid	  all	  the	  legal	  costs	  and	  that	  their	   lawyer	  represented	  Antigua	  during	  the	  entire	  
case,	  helping	  to	  overcome	  the	  resource	  constraints	  of	  this	  small	  country.
65
	  
A	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  US	  online	  gambling	  companies	  turned	  to	  a	  foreign	  government	  to	  file	  a	  
WTO	   complaint	   was	   that	   their	   initial	   efforts	   to	   convince	   the	   US	   authorities	   (i.e.	   their	   home	  
government)	  to	  lift	  the	  trade	  barriers	  were	  unsuccessful.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  largely	  because	  of	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their	   lack	   of	   political	   resources	   in	   the	   US	   and	   their	   limited	   perceived	   contribution	   to	   the	   US	  
economy.	  In	  addition,	  gambling,	  because	  of	  its	  negative	  social	  externalities,	  is	  considered	  a	  ‘sin’	  
industry.
66
	   For	   gambling,	   and	   other	   ‘sin’	   sectors	   like	   tobacco	   and	   alcohol,	   this	   status	   involves	  
certain	  costs,
67
	  including	  low	  political	  leverage.	  Finally,	  the	  online	  gambling	  firms	  faced	  powerful	  
opposing	   actors	   at	   the	   domestic	   level:	   traditional	   gambling	   companies	   (in	   particular	   casinos),	  
several	  of	  the	  major	  professional	  sports	  league	  associations	  and	  religious	  groups.
68
	  This	  coalition	  
of	   opposing	   domestic	   interests,	   including	   some	   very	   active	   NGOs,	   further	   undermined	   their	  
efforts	   to	   secure	  support	   from	  their	  home	  government,	   leaving	   them	  with	   little	  choice	  but	   to	  
target	  the	  host	  government.	  
In	   sum,	   the	   Antigua-­‐US	   gambling	   case	   challenges	   the	   conventional	   view	   that,	   when	   seeking	  
redress	   in	   an	   international	   trade	   dispute,	   firms	   lobby	   their	   own	   government.	   	   Unlike	   Kodak,	  
these	  US	  MNEs	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  important	  actors	  in	  their	  domestic	  economy	  and	  faced	  strong	  
opposition	   from	   powerful	   domestic	   interest	   groups.	   They	   therefore	   chose	   to	   challenge	   the	  
legislation	   at	  multilateral	   level,	   through	   the	   state	  where	   they	   based	  much	   of	   their	   economic	  
activity.	  The	  small	  size	  and	  power	  of	  that	  state	  was	  counteracted	  by	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  MNEs	  
mobilized	  in	  support	  of	  their	  challenge.	  The	  fact	  that	  Antigua	  won	  the	  challenge	  on	  several	  key	  
points	  indicates	  that	  such	  a	  strategy	  can	  be	  effective,	  although	  so	  far	  the	  US	  has	  failed	  to	  bring	  
its	  law	  into	  compliance,	  underlining	  the	  limitations	  of	  even	  the	  WTO’s	  legal	  machinery.	  	  
EU-­‐China	  Footwear	  
In	  2005	  the	  quota	  system	  which	  had	  restricted	  trade	  in	  many	  fashion	  goods	  came	  to	  an	  end	  and	  
trade	  between	  WTO	  members	  was	  liberalized.	  It	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  liberalization	  
was	   impacting	   strongly	  on	  exports	   from	  China,	  which	   increased	  very	   rapidly	   to	  most	   affected	  
markets.
69
	  Intense	  pressure	  was	  put	  on	  policy	  makers	  by	  local	  manufacturers	  in	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  US	  to	  react.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  footwear	  sector,	  the	  outcome	  was	  an	  industry	  request	  for	  
an	   AD	   investigation	   to	   secure	   protection	   against	   ‘dumped’	   exports.	   Further	   to	   the	   ensuing	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investigation,	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  in	  2006	  to	  impose	  anti-­‐dumping	  duties	  (ADDs)	  on	  Chinese	  
and	  Vietnamese	  footwear.	  The	  case	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  several	  in-­‐depth	  analyses	  which	  we	  will	  
draw	  on	  here.
70
	  These	  studies	  highlight	  both	  how	  divisive	  the	  case	  was	  for	  EU	  Member	  States
71
	  
and	  how	  active	  a	  variety	  of	  companies	  were	  in	  lobbying	  both	  for	  and	  against	  the	  duties.
72
	  	  
Importantly,	   the	   domestic	   import-­‐competing	   producers	  who	  were	   in	   favor	   of	   ADDs	  were	   not	  
alone	   in	   lobbying	   EU	   governments	   and	   the	   European	   Commission.	   Companies	   with	   vested	  
interests	   in	   low	   cost	   imports	   also	  mobilized	   and	   lobbied	   against	   protection.	   They	   established	  
two	  ad-­‐hoc	  lobbying	  platforms:	  the	  European	  Branded	  Footwear	  Coalition	  (EBFC)	  representing	  
branded	   footwear	   and	   the	   Footwear	  Association	  of	   Importers	   and	  Retail	   chains	   (FAIR)	  mainly	  
representing	  retailers.	   In	  addition	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  Federation	  of	   the	  European	  Sporting	  Goods	  
Industry	  (FESI)	  lobbied	  heavily	  (and	  successfully)	  to	  exclude	  sport	  shoes	  from	  the	  investigation.
73
	  	  
One	  of	  the	  notable	  aspects	  of	  this	  case	  is	  that	  import-­‐dependent	  firms	  (domestic	  retailers	  and	  
brands	  operating	  within	  GVCs)	   can	  mobilize	   and	   lobby	  effectively.	   This	   is	   counter	   to	   received	  
wisdom	  that	  domestic	  	  import-­‐competing	  or	  export	  oriented	  producers	  	  are	  essentially	  the	  key	  
actors	  lobbying	  in	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena.	  Lawton	  and	  McGuire	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  propensity	  
of	  the	  EU	  textiles	  sector	  to	  lobby	  for	  trade	  protection	  has	  been	  mitigated	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  
other	  adjustment	  strategies	  to	  cope	  with	  trade	  liberalization,	  including	  out-­‐sourcing.
74
	  A	  similar	  
process	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  more	  diverse	  range	  of	  policy	  preferences	  within	  the	  footwear	  sector.	  
As	   a	   recent	   analysis	   concluded	   ‘…the	   conventional	  wisdom	  of	  political	   economy,	   that	   import-­‐
competing	  firms	  can	  overcome	  collective	  action	  problems	  in	  a	  way	  that	  consumers	  and	  others	  
cannot	   and	   drive	   protectionist	   policies,	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   fully	   accurate	   description	   of	   trade	  
politics.’
75
	  Eckhardt	  argues	  that	  import-­‐dependent	  firms	  in	  particular	  are	  increasingly	  mobilizing	  
politically	  and	  postulates	  that	  they	  do	  so	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  costs	  of	  adjustment	  are	  high	  (there	  
are	   limited	  alternative	  sources)	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  mobilization	  are	   low	  (an	  existing	   lobby	  group	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exists,	  or	  firms	  are	  relatively	  concentrated	  and	  easy	  to	  mobilize).
76
	  Both	  conditions	  were	  met	  in	  
the	  footwear	  case.	  	  
What	   makes	   the	   footwear	   case	   particularly	   interesting,	   in	   light	   of	   this	   article,	   is	   that	   it	   also	  
involved	   multilateral	   action.	   The	   procedure	   for	   investigating	   Chinese	   (and	   Vietnamese)	  
companies	   in	   anti-­‐dumping	   cases	   is	   different	   to	   most	   other	   countries,	   as	   they	   are	   not	   yet	  
considered	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  Market	  Economies.
77
	  This	  particularity	  became	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  WTO	  
DSB	  challenge	  by	  China.	  	  There	  is	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  EU	  footwear	  retailers,	  together	  with	  
their	   Chinese	   suppliers,	   were	   instrumental	   in	   persuading	   the	   Chinese	   government	   to	   launch	  
what	  was	  only	  their	  second	  WTO	  case	  against	  the	  EU.
78
	  Their	  objective	  was	  clearly	  to	  avoid	  the	  
continuance	  of	  the	  AD	  action	  and	  reduce	  the	  chances	  of	  future	  action.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  the	  WTO	  
ruled	   in	   favor	   of	   China	   on	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   case,	   while	   the	   EU	   ADDs	   expired	   without	  
challenge	  in	  due	  course,	  their	  objectives	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  achieved.	  	  
Thus	  the	  footwear	  case	  challenges	  the	  classic	  view	  of	  CPA	  in	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena	  in	  two	  ways.	  
Firstly,	   import-­‐dependent	   firms	   in	   the	   EU	   overcame	   the	   intrinsic	   difficulties	   with	   collective	  
action	   to	   lobby	   against	   trade	   protection	   and	   secondly,	   once	   they	   failed	   to	   secure	   an	   overtly	  
positive	   outcome	   domestically,	   these	   same	   EU	   companies	   engaged	   in	   transnational	   CPA	   and	  
lobbied	  a	  foreign	  government	  to	  challenge	  their	  own	  governments’	  handling	  of	  the	  case	  at	  the	  
WTO.	  	  	  	  
EU-­‐China	  solar	  panels	  
In	   July	  2012	  a	  coalition	  of	  EU	  solar	  panel	  producers	  who	  had	  mobilized	  together	   in	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  
alliance	   called	  Prosun,	   filed	   a	   complaint	  with	   the	   European	  Commission	   alleging	   that	   Chinese	  
solar	   panels	   were	   being	   sold	   on	   the	   EU	   market	   at	   dumped	   prices.	   The	   complaint	   followed	  
impressive	  growth	   in	  Chinese	  solar	  exports	  globally	  and	  a	   similar	   case	   in	   the	  US,	  where	  ADDs	  
had	  been	  imposed	  a	  few	  months	  earlier.	  Almost	  immediately	  another	  ad-­‐hoc	  lobby	  group	  –	  the	  
Alliance	  for	  Affordable	  Solar	  Energy	  (AFASE)	  -­‐	  was	  formed	  to	  oppose	  the	  proposed	  AD	  action.	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These	   trade	   tensions	   in	   the	   solar	   sector	   have	   also	   been	   subject	   to	   quite	   extensive	   analysis,	  
which	   has	   highlighted	   the	   strong	   interdependence	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   Chinese	   solar	   panel	  
industries,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   companies	   adjusted	   their	   production	   structures	   in	  
response	   to	   new	   restrictions.
79
	   Studies	   have	   also	   highlighted	   the	   controversy	   around	   the	  
proposed	   imposition	   of	   ADDs	   on	   solar	   panels,	   in	   the	   EU
80
	   and	   the	   US.
81
	   	   The	   arguments	  
mobilized	  by	  AD	  opponents	  were	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  the	  footwear	  case:	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  
solar	  panels	  would	  disadvantage	  EU	  consumers,	   retailers	  and	   installers.	  However,	   there	  was	  a	  
wider	   group	   of	   interests	   involved	   in	   AFASE,	  which	   had	   over	   800	  members	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
case.	   These	   included	   not	   just	   importers,	   but	   exporters	   of	   raw	   materials	   and	   manufacturing	  
machinery	  to	  the	  solar	  panel	  industry	  in	  China,	  as	  well	  as	  Chinese	  exporters	  themselves.	  It	  was	  
therefore	   an	   inter-­‐sectoral	   company	   grouping,	   but	   also	   a	   transnational	   one,	   quite	   a	   rare	  
undertaking	  outside	  of	  regional	  structures	  like	  the	  EU.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  product	  also	  ensured	  
that	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  environmental	   lobby	  were	  mobilized.	  Environmental	  NGOs,	  although	  
they	  did	  not	  join	  AFASE,	  issued	  a	  supportive	  press	  release	  underlining	  that	  low	  cost	  solar	  energy	  
was	  necessary	  if	  the	  EU	  was	  to	  meet	  its	  commitment	  to	  transition	  from	  carbon	  intensive	  energy	  
sources.
82
	  
It	  is	  the	  cross-­‐country	  element	  of	  the	  lobbying	  coalition,	  which	  is	  most	  novel	  in	  this	  case.	  It	  is	  a	  
clear	  example	  of	  transnational	  CPA.	  That	  EU	  retailers	  in	  the	  footwear	  case	  could	  overcome	  their	  
collective	   action	   problems	   to	   lobby	   together	   was	   understandable,	   given	   their	   high	   costs	   of	  
adjustment	   (few	  alternative	  high	  volume/low	  cost	   sources)	  and	   low	  costs	  of	  mobilization,	  not	  
least	  because	  they	  were	  relatively	  concentrated	  large	  companies.
83
	  That	  Chinese	  exporters	  and	  
their	   EU	   customers	   should	   lobby	   collectively	   in	   a	   relatively	   fragmented	   industry	   is	   more	  
surprising.	  However,	   it	   is	  well	  established	   in	   the	   literature	   that	  a	  perceived	   threat	   to	  material	  
interests,	  as	  a	   result	  of	  changes	   in	  market	  conditions,	   is	  a	  primary	  condition	  affecting	  a	   firm’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79
	  Curran	  2015;	  Dunford	  et.	  al.	  2013;	  Lewis	  2014.	  
80
	  Kolk	  and	  Curran	  2016.	  
81
	  Carbaugh	  and	  St	  Brown	  2012.	  
82
	  WWF	  2013.	  
83
	  Eckhardt	  2011.	  
	   17	  
decision	  to	  lobby.
84
	  The	  potentially	  high	  costs	  of	  adjustment	  to	  new	  trade	  costs,	  were	  certainly	  a	  
key	  motivation.	  For	  EU	   importers,	   there	  were	  few	  alternative	  sources	  with	  China’s	  production	  
capacity.
85
	   For	   the	  Chinese	  exporters,	   they	  were	  highly	   reliant	  on	   the	  EU	  market,	  where	   their	  
business	  model	  was	  under	  threat.
86
	  As	  the	  case	  advanced,	  the	  involvement	  of	  Chinese	  suppliers	  
became	   less	  evident,	  partly	   in	   response	   to	  heavy	   criticism	  by	   the	  domestic	   solar	   lobby	  of	   the	  
involvement	  of	  ‘foreign’	  companies	  in	  the	  political	  process.
87
	  This	  experience	  shows	  that,	  even	  if	  
transnational	   groupings	   succeed	   in	   overcoming	   their	   collective	   action	   problems	   to	   lobby	  
together,	  certain	  MNEs	  still	  face	  problems	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  domestic	  political	  process	  linked	  
to	  their	  ‘Liability	  of	  Foreignness’.
88
	  
Thus	  the	  solar	  case,	  like	  the	  footwear	  case,	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  differential	  integration	  into	  
GVCs	  is	  increasingly	  changing	  the	  balance	  of	  interests	  within	  ‘domestic’	  industry.	  In	  addition,	  it	  
is	   creating	   the	  conditions	   for	  both	   import-­‐dependent	   firms	   	  and	   foreign	  companies	   to	  engage	  
more	   actively	   in	   the	   political	   process	   in	   defense	   of	   openness.	   The	   case	   	   shows	   that,	   under	  
certain	  circumstances,	  foreign	  companies	  may	  become	  involved	  in	  CPA.	  The	  Chinese	  companies	  
in	   this	   case	  were	   instrumental	   in	  establishing	   the	  AFASE	  alliance.	  Rather	   than	   relying	  on	   their	  
home	   government	   to	   put	   pressure	   on	   the	   EU,	   they	   actively	   engaged	   in	   the	   	   political	   process	  
within	  the	  EU.	  
WTO	  challenge	  by	  five	  countries	  to	  Australia’s	  plain	  packaging	  legislation	  	  
In	  2012	  Australia	  became	  the	   first	   country	   in	   the	  world	   to	   introduce	  a	   legal	   requirement	   that	  
cigarettes	  and	  other	  tobacco	  products	  be	  presented	  in	  plain	  packaging	  (PP),	  as	  a	  public	  health	  
measure	  to	  reduce	  tobacco	  consumption.	  This	  move	  was	  vehemently	  opposed	  by	  the	  tobacco	  
industry	  who	  argued	   that	   their	   intellectual	  property	  was	  being	  appropriated.	  They	  challenged	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  Raymond	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  1966,p.	  200	  explained	  it	  thus:	  “…any	  threat	  to	  the	  established	  position	  of	  an	  enterprise	  is	  a	  
powerful	  galvanizing	  force	  to	  action;	  in	  fact…[a]	  threat	  in	  general	  is	  a	  more	  reliable	  stimulus	  to	  action	  than	  an	  
opportunity	  is	  likely	  to	  be.”	  Since	  Vernon’s	  observation,	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  firms	  are	  indeed	  much	  more	  likely	  
to	  lobby	  when	  faced	  with	  potential	  losses	  in	  revenue	  than	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  lucrative	  market	  opportunity.	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Australia’s	   legislation	   on	   several	   levels.	   Firstly,	   in	   Australia	   itself,	   where	   Japan	   Tobacco	  
International	  (JTI)	  and	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  (BAT)	  mounted	  an	  unsuccessful	  challenge	  in	  the	  
Australian	   High	   Court.
89
	   The	   next	   challenge	   was	   bilateral	   –through	   the	   Hong	   Kong-­‐Australia	  
Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty	  (BIT)	  –	  where	  Philip	  Morris	  International	  (PMI)	  challenged	  the	  new	  
law.
90
	   This	   was	   rejected	   for	   jurisdictional,	   rather	   than	   substantial	   reasons.
91
	   Finally,	   at	   the	  
multilateral	  level,	  the	  Ukraine,	  Honduras,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Cuba	  and	  Indonesia	  brought	  
a	   series	   of	   DSB	   cases	   against	   Australia	   in	   the	   WTO.	   Their	   claims	   centered	   on	   the	   alleged	  
infringement	   of	   several	   articles	   of	   the	   Trade	   Related	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (TRIPs)	  
agreement,	  due	   to	   the	  banning	  of	  company	   logos	  and	   trademarks.
92
	  This	  case	   is	   still	  ongoing,	  
although	  Ukraine	  has	  withdrawn	  its	  complaint	  following	  a	  change	  of	  government.
93
	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   this	   paper,	   the	   political	   behavior	   by	   the	   transnational	   tobacco	   companies	  
(TTCs)	  is	  interesting	  for	  three	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  action	  took	  place	  at	  national	  and	  international	  
level	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  As	  WTO	  litigation	  is	  a	  very	  costly	  affair,	  the	  traditional	  view	  is	  that	  firms	  
only	  resort	  to	  lobbying	  for	  WTO	  action	  after	  all	  other	  options	  have	  been	  exhausted.
94
	  However,	  
the	   TTCs	  were	   engaged	   in	   lobbying	   for	  WTO	   litigation,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   also	   pursuing	  
investor	   state	   arbitration	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   BIT	   and	   a	   domestic	   court	   case	   in	   Australia.	   The	  
recourse	   to	   several	   different	   policy	   arenas	   is	   unusual.	   In	   the	   presence	   of	   high	   levels	   of	  
uncertainty	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  different	   levels	  of	  action,	   it	  seems	   likely	  that	  the	  TTCs	  saw	  the	  
choice	   of	   several	   different	   arenas	   as	   the	   most	   effective	   way	   to	   secure	   a	   positive	   outcome.	  
Brooks	  has	  argued	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  US	  domestic	  context	  the	  complexity	  of	  trade	  policy-­‐making	  
requires	   a	  meta-­‐strategy,	  which,	   although	   it	  may	  appear	   to	   consist	  of	   ‘do	  everything	  and	   see	  
what	  works’,	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  conscious	  integration	  of	  sub-­‐strategies	  which	  are	  mutually	  supportive.
95
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Pursuing	   such	   a	   ‘meta-­‐strategy’	   also	   provides	   the	  opportunity	   to	   shift	   the	   framing	  of	   the	   key	  
points	  at	  issue	  to	  the	  most	  supportive	  arena,	  as	  the	  outcomes	  at	  different	  levels	  emerge.
96
	  	  
Secondly,	   the	   choice	   of	   governments	   for	   CPA	   in	   this	   case	   was	   unusual.	   Finding	   common	  
interests	  with	   a	  member	   state	   of	   the	  WTO	  was	   an	   inevitable	   step	   in	  mounting	   a	  multilateral	  
challenge.	  As	  highlighted	  above,	  only	  states	  can	  bring	  cases	  against	  other	  governments’	  policies	  
in	  the	  WTO	  However,	  one	  would	  have	  expected	  BAT	  or	  PMI	  to	  lobby	  their	  home	  state	  (the	  US)	  
to	  challenge	  the	  Australian	  legislation	  in	  WTO	  –	  rather	  than	  Ukraine,	  Honduras,	  the	  Dominican	  
Republic,	   Cuba	   or	   Indonesia.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   tobacco,	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   recourse	   to	   host	  
countries	   seems	   to	   lie	   in	   the	   limited	   political	   influence	   of	   these	   companies	   in	   their	   ‘home’	  
countries.	   Like	   in	   the	   gambling	   case	   above,	   tobacco	   is	   considered	   a	   ‘sin	   industry’	   and	   thus	  
suffers	  from	  a	  growing	  lack	  of	  political	  support.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  in	  developed	  countries	  with	  
increasingly	   extensive	   and	   well-­‐established	   tobacco	   control	   regulation.
97
	   Non-­‐governmental	  
actors	  have	  been	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  this	  evolution,	  with	  an	  ‘epistemic	  community’	  of	  NGOs,	  
academics	  and	  public	  health	  professionals	   increasingly	  capable	  of	  challenging	  the	  strategies	  of	  
tobacco	  companies	  internationally.
98
	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  chances	  of	  persuading	  a	  home	  country	  of	  
one	  of	  the	  TTCs	  to	  pursue	  a	  case	  were	  low	  and	  the	  pool	  of	  likely	  target	  states	  for	  CPA	  beyond	  
their	  home	  countries	  was	  relatively	  limited.
99
	  	  
Thirdly,	   none	   of	   the	   plaintiff	   countries	   in	   the	   PP	   case	   was	   a	   significant	   exporter	   of	   tobacco	  
products	   to	  Australia.	   They	  were	  unlikely	   to	   be	   strongly	   affected	  by	   the	   new	   restrictions	   and	  
thus	  subject	  to	  rather	  limited	  compensation,	  even	  if	  the	  case	  were	  to	  be	  ruled	  in	  their	  favor.
100
	  
This	   is	   not	   the	   first	   time	   a	   country	   without	   a	   direct	   trade	   interest	   has	   challenged	   another	  
member	  state’s	  policy	  in	  WTO.	  The	  US	  challenged	  the	  EU’s	  banana	  regime,	  in	  spite	  of	  having	  no	  
banana	  exports.	  This	  was	  largely	  because	  several	  large	  US	  based	  MNEs,	  with	  political	  influence	  
in	  Washington,	  had	  substantial	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  (FDI)	  in	  countries	  negatively	  affected	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by	  that	  regime.
101
	  The	  choice	  by	  the	  complainant	  countries	  to	  pursue	  the	  PP	  case	  seems	  likely	  to	  
be	  related,	  not	  to	  outward	  FDI,	  but	  rather	  to	  inward	  FDI.	  	  
The	  tobacco	  industry	  is	  among	  the	  most	  concentrated	  in	  the	  world:
	  102
	  	  four	  MNEs	  control	  more	  
than	   half	   of	   the	   global	   tobacco	   market	   outside	   China.
103
	   TTCs	   are	   present	   worldwide	   and	  
although	   their	   geographic	   coverage	   varies	   depending	   on	   their	   individual	   histories,	   one,	   or	  
several	   TTCs	   are	   active	   on	  most	  world	  markets.	   	   Production	   facilities	   are	  more	   concentrated,	  
with	  a	   few	   large	   factories	  often	   serving	  as	  hubs	   for	   local	   regions.
104
	   This	   gives	   the	   companies	  
political	  leverage	  with	  some	  host	  states.
105
Like	  Antigua	  in	  the	  gambling	  case,	  these	  countries	  are	  
part	  of	  the	  ‘rent	  chain’	  of	  the	  TTCs	  and	  therefore	  legitimate	  targets	  for	  CPA.	  	  
Aside	  from	  Cuba,	  the	  complainants	  in	  the	  PP	  case	  generally	  have	  an	  important	  presence	  of	  TTCs,	  
including	   through	   processing	   facilities
106
.	   Like	   Antigua,	   the	   complainants	   are	   relatively	   small	  
and/or	  developing	  states,	  with	  limited	  administrative	  capacity.
107
	  However	  here	  too,	  the	  MNEs	  
involved	  provided	  material	  support.	  BAT	  is	  paying	  the	  legal	  expenses	  of	  Honduras	  and	  Ukraine,	  
while	   PMI	   has	   paid	   those	   of	   the	   Dominican	   Republic.
108
	   The	   case	   thus	   represented	   a	   major	  
financial	   investment	   for	   the	   TTCs	   and	   can	   be	   seen	   as,	   for	   all	   intents	   and	   purposes,	   a	  
continuation	  of	  their	  CPA	  at	  national	  and	  bilateral	  level	  through	  the	  multilateral	  system.	  	  
The	  use	  of	   their	  economic	   leverage	  and	  provision	  of	  material	   support	  by	  TTCs	  does	  not	  alone	  
explain	   the	   countries’	  decision	   to	   challenge	   the	   legislation.	  These	   countries	  are	  all	   tobacco	  or	  
cigarette	   producers,	   even	   if	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   sector	   varies.	   Their	   challenge	   is	   thus	   also	  
related	  to	  their	  concerns,	  shared	  with	  TTCs	  and	  producer	  countries,	  about	  the	  impact	  on	  their	  
global	  exports	  of	  regulatory	  ‘spill	  over’.	  Several	  other	  countries	  including	  the	  UK,	  New	  Zealand	  
and	  France	  were	  actively	  debating	  similar	   legislation	  as	  Australia’s	  became	  operational.
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  Cadot	  and	  Webber	  2002	  for	  an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  banana	  dispute	  and	  its	  motivations.	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uncertainty	  created	  by	  a	  legal	  challenge	  at	  WTO	  can	  delay	  the	  introduction	  of	  similar	  legislation	  
elsewhere	   –	   so	   called	   ‘regulatory	   chill’	   –	   containing	   the	   threat.
110
	   Thus	   a	   key	   advantage	   of	   a	  
WTO	  challenge,	  is	  that	  it	  can	  have	  a	  regulatory	  impact	  well	  beyond	  the	  targeted	  state.	  
What	  the	  case	  demonstrates	   is	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  dispute	  resolution	   in	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  
system	  is	  only	  open	  to	  states,	  has	  opened	  the	  possibility	  for	  MNEs	  to	  lobby	  countries	  in	  which	  
they	  have	  an	  important	  economic	  presence,	  to	  represent	  their	  interests	  at	  the	  multilateral	  level.	  
Thus	   perceived	   dependence	   on	   an	   MNE	   can	   secure	   the	   leverage	   required	   with	   host	  
governments	   to	   access	   the	   multilateral	   system.	   This	   mode	   of	   CPA	   is	   very	   different	   to	   that	  
proposed	   by	   Baron,	   although	   it	   reflects	   his	   forecast	   that,	   as	   WTO	   became	   more	   important	  
“…nonmarket	  strategies	  will	  be	  directed	  at	  influencing	  governments	  in	  which	  the	  company	  has	  
located	  components	  of	   its	  rent	  chain	  to	  position	   issues	  strategically	  at	   the	  WTO…”.
111
	   	  The	  PP	  
case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  precisely	  such	  a	  strategy.	  
	  
5	  	   A	  revised	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  international	  CPA	  in	  the	  trade	  arena	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  draw	  on	  the	  case	  study	  material	  presented	  above	  to	  answer	  our	  key	  research	  
question	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  globalization	  of	  value	  chains	  and	  trade	  governance	  on	  trade	  CPA.	  On	  
that	  basis,	  we	  propose	  a	  revised	  framework	  to	  understand	  trade	  policy-­‐making,	  reflecting	  these	  
evolutions.	   The	   above	  analysis	   highlights	   that	   trade	  policy	  CPA	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   solely	   domestic	  
activity,	   focused	   on	   clear	   domestic	   interests.	   Rather,	   it	   has	   become	   a	   multi-­‐level	   process,	  
operating	  across	  national/regional	  and	  multilateral	  axes,	  as	  interests	  increasingly	  cross	  borders	  
and	  jurisdictions.	  The	  cases	  discussed	  above	  demonstrate	  the	  emergence	  of	  lobbying	  coalitions	  
combining	  domestic	   (import	  dependent)	   firms	  and	   ‘foreign’	  companies;	  as	  well	  as	   lobbying	  of	  
‘host’	   countries	   to	   take	   action,	   both	   against	   ‘home’	   countries	   and	   against	   third	   countries.	   As	  
MNEs	  have	  expanded	  their	  impact	  across	  their	  GVCs	  and	  shifted	  the	  fora	  of	  their	  CPA,	  so	  non-­‐
state	   actors,	   especially	   NGOs,	   have	   evolved	   their	   own	   global	   strategies,	   including	   supportive	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lobbying	   with	   MNEs	   where	   they	   have	   shared	   interests	   and	   counteractive	   lobbying	   when	  
interests	  are	  opposed.	   	   In	  Table	  1	  we	  providing	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  cases	  explored	  above	  along	  
the	   main	   dimensions	   of	   the	   actors	   involved	   and	   their	   market	   and	   non-­‐market	   context.	   The	  
Kodak/Fuji	  case	  is	  included	  to	  highlight	  the	  main	  changes	  since	  Baron	  published	  his	  work	  in	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s.	  	  
	  
Table	  1	  –	  Actors	  involved	  and	  main	  dimensions	  of	  market	  and	  non-­‐market	  context	  in	  the	  cases	  
analysed	  	  
Dimension	   Kodak/Fuji	   Antigua-­‐US	   EU-­‐China	  
footwear	  
EU-­‐China	  
solar	  	  
Australia	  PP	  
Formal	  
complainant	  
Kodak	   Antigua	   EU	  footwear	  
manufacturer
s	  
EU	  solar	  panel	  
producers	  
Ukraine,	  
Honduras,	  DR,	  
Cuba,	  
Indonesia	  
Focal	  
companies	  
involved	  in	  
CPA	  
Kodak	   US	  gambling	  
companies	  
EU	  importers	  
(and	  Chinese	  
exporters)	  
EU	  importers	  
(and	  Chinese	  
exporters)	  
Transnational	  
Tobacco	  
Companies	  
Non	  market	  
environmen
t	  in	  home	  
country	  
Political	  
influence	  
Little	  political	  
influence:	  
nature	  of	  
industry	  (Sin).	  
Little	  political	  
influence	  :	  
importers	  
seen	  as	  less	  
‘productive’	  
than	  
manufacturer
s	  
Little	  political	  
influence	  :	  
Importers	  
seen	  as	  less	  
‘productive’	  
than	  
manufacturer
s	  
Little	  political	  
influence:	  
nature	  of	  
industry	  (Sin).	  
Market	  
environmen
t	  
Global	  
duopoly	  	  
A	  few	  large	  
companies.	  
Importers	  
highly	  
concentrated	  
and	  
organized.	  
Producers	  
more	  
dispersed,	  but	  
well	  
organized.	  
EU	  installers	  
highly	  
dispersed;	  
Chinese	  
producers	  
more	  
concentrated.	  
EU	  producers	  
concentrated.	  
Oligopoly.	  
Four	  large	  
companies	  
control	  most	  
of	  the	  world	  
market	  
Trade	  policy	  
context	  
Domestic	   Multilevel	  	   First	  regional	  
(EU)	  then	  
multilateral	  	  	  
Regional	  (EU)	   National,	  
bilateral	  and	  
multilateral	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simultaneously	  	  
Key	  actors	   	   	   	   	   	  
Local	  
producers	  
yes	   no	   yes	   yes	   limited	  
Foreign	  
MNEs	  	  
yes	   yes	   In	  latter	  
stages	  
yes	   yes	  
WTO	   subsequentl
y	  
yes	   subsequently	   no	   yes	  
Regional	  
institutions	  
no	   no	   yes	  (EU)	   yes	  (EU)	   yes	  (BIT)	  
NGO	  
influence	  
no	   yes	  
(counteractive
)	  
no	   yes	  
(supportive)	  
yes	  
(counteractive
)	  
Source	  –	  Own	  elaboration	  
Our	   above	   analysis	   provides	   strong	   evidence	   that	   the	   traditional	   two	   country	  model	   of	   trade	  
disputes,	   focused	   on	   importers	   in	   one	   country	   and	   exporters	   in	   the	   other,	   is	   outdated.	   Our	  
understanding	   of	   CPA	   in	   trade	   policy	   needs	   to	   expand	   to	   include,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   third	  
countries	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	  NGOs,	  which	   can	   be	   as	   active	   in	   the	   political	   arena	   as	   states	   or	  
MNEs	  and	  whose	  actions	  have	  impacted,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  on	  the	  gambling,	  solar	  panel	  and	  
tobacco	   cases	   discussed	   above.	   The	   main	   conclusion	   from	   our	   case	   analyses	   is	   that	   the	  
international	   trade	   policy	   framework	   is	   now	   significantly	   more	   complex	   than	   suggested	   by	  
Baron	  and	  others	  and,	  therefore,	  his	  conceptual	  framework	  needs	  to	  be	  revised.
112
	   In	  order	  to	  
clarify	  the	  bases	  for	  our	  revisions,	  Table	  2	  highlights	  our	  key	  findings	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  MNEs	  
strategic	  responses	  to	  the	  changed	  global	  context.	  It	  provides	  a	  detailed	  summary	  of	  the	  novel	  
aspects	  of	   the	   cases	  discussed	  above,	   the	  motivations	   for	   these	   innovative	  CPA	  practices	  and	  
their	  organization.	  The	  Kodak/Fuji	  case	  is	  again	  included	  for	  comparison.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  highly	  
concentrated	  nature	  of	   the	   industry	  posed	  no	  collective	  action	  problems,	  with	   the	  main	   issue	  
being	  trade	  access,	  rather	  than	  investment,	  the	  target	  country	  being	  the	  home	  country	  and	  no	  
indication	  that	  NGOs	  were	  active.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112
	  Brook	  2005	  has	  already	  highlighted	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  the	  context	  was	  more	  complex	  than	  
suggested	  in	  Baron’s	  work.	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  Table	  2	  Motivations	  and	  organization	  of	  novel	  CPA	  actions	  in	  the	  Cases	  covered	  
	  
Source	  –	  own	  elaboration.	  	  
In	   Figure	   1,	   we	   draw	   on	   the	   findings	   summarized	   above	   to	   propose	   a	   modified	   policy	  
framework,	  based	  on	  Baron’s,	  but	   reflecting	  both	  changes	   in	   trade	  governance	  and	   the	  move	  
from	  domestic	   to	   transnational	  CPA.	  Although	  our	   framework	   reflects	  a	   two	  country	  model	  –	  
country	  A	  (the	  exporter)	  and	  Country	  B	  (the	  importer)	  -­‐	  the	  homogeneous	  two	  industry/interest	  
model	  is	  deconstructed,	  while	  the	  possibility	  that	  companies	  will	  lobby	  beyond	  their	  home	  state	  
is	  acknowledged.	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An	  important	  change	  in	  the	  framework	  is	  to	  deconstruct	  ‘domestic’	  interests	  to	  take	  account	  of	  
their	  increasing	  diversity.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  exporting	  country	  A,	  bilateral	  trade	  policy	  priorities	  
would	   traditionally	   be	   focused	   on	   the	   interests	   of	   domestic	   industries,	   which	   export	   their	  
products	   to	   Country	   B	   and	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   maximizing	   market	   opening.	   However,	   the	  
involvement	  of	  foreign	  investors	  (FI)	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  country	  A,	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  
the	  interests	  of	  these	  firms	  may	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  regulatory	  actions	  of	  Country	  B,	  even	  in	  
cases	  where	  Country	  B	  is	  their	  home	  state	  or	  where	  most	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Country	  B’s	  actions	  
are	   outside	   Country	   A.	   In	   the	   event	   that	   home	   country	   (i.e.	   Govt	   B)	   lobbying	   fails	   (as	   in	   the	  
gambling	   and	   tobacco	   cases)	   CPA	   aimed	   at	  mobilizing	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   (host)	   country	   (i.e.	  
Govt	  A)	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  at	  the	  multilateral	  level,	  becomes	  an	  option.	  	  
Table	  2	  provides	  indications	  of	  the	  factors	  influencing	  the	  strategic	  decision	  to	  lobby	  outside	  the	  
‘home’	   state	   (political	   disadvantage)	   and	   the	   choice	   of	   host	   country	   (dependence	   on	   FDI	   or	  
trade).	  These	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  Such	  transnational	  CPA	  may	  occur	  even	  
in	  cases	  which	  are	  only	  related	  to	  Country	  A’s	   interests	   indirectly,	  or	  over	  the	  long	  term	  (as	  in	  
the	  tobacco	  case).	   	   In	  addition,	  depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  openness	  of	  its	  political	  system,	  civil	  
society	  may	  be	  active	  in	  country	  A	  on	  the	  issue	  areas	  of	  interest	  to	  companies.	  This	  could	  be	  for	  
example	   in	   the	   form	   of	   trade	   unions	   worried	   about	   the	   employment	   impacts	   of	   MNE	  
withdrawal,	  or	  through	  NGOs	  militating	  on	  related	  issues	  like	  environmental	  protection	  (in	  the	  
solar	  case)	  or	  tobacco	  and	  gambling	  control	  (in	  the	  tobacco	  and	  gambling	  cases).
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  In	  the	  case	  
of	   the	   importing	   country	   B,	   governments	   are	   increasingly	   being	   lobbied,	   not	   only	   by	   import-­‐
competing	   local	  producers	  seeking	  protection,	  but	  also	  by	   import-­‐dependent	   firms	   (IDFs)	  who	  
are	  vehement	  supporters	  of	  trade	   liberalization	  (as	  evidenced	   in	  the	  footwear	  and	  solar	  cases	  
and	  highlighted	  in	  Table	  2).	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  See	  Mukherjee	  and	  Ekanayake	  2009	  on	  NGOs	  in	  the	  tobacco	  control	  arena	  and	  Farrand	  2015	  on	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  NGO	  lobbying	  against	  ACTA,	  a	  trade	  agreement	  rejected	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  
	   26	  
	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  Modified	  international	  trade	  policy	  framework	  
One	  further	  evolution	  we	  note	  is	  that	  companies	  also	  lobby	  countries	  outside	  of	  even	  their	  host	  
country	  policy	  space.	  Providing	  that	  they	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  country’s	  economy,	  for	  
example	  through	  their	  imports,	  MNEs	  can	  have	  political	  leverage,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  FDI.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  recourse	  to	  action	  at	  the	  multilateral	   level,	  the	  same	  alliance	  of	  import-­‐dependent	  
firms	   (IDF	   in	   our	   framework)	   in	   country	   B	   and	   exporters	   in	   country	   A,	   which	   lobbies	   against	  
trade	   protection	   in	   the	   former,	   may	   lobby	   country	   A	   to	   take	   action	   against	   country	   B.	   This	  
happened	  in	  the	  footwear	  case,	  when	  the	  Chinese	  government	  was	  lobbied	  by	  EU	  importers	  to	  
challenge	  the	  case	  at	  the	  WTO.	  In	  this	  case,	  EU	  import-­‐dependent	  firms	  had	  essentially	  no	  FDI	  in	  
China,	  which	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  be	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  leverage	  or	  legitimacy	  in	  such	  CPA.	  	  	  The	  
presence	  of	  a	  large	  share	  of	  their	  GVC	  in	  China	  was	  sufficient	  to	  create	  common	  interests	  with	  
local	  exporters	  and	  facilitate	  successful	  CPA	  there.	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Of	  course	  not	  all	   firms	  are	  willing,	  or	  able,	   to	  pursue	  an	   international	  CPA	  strategy.	   	  Based	  on	  
our	   analysis	   and	   existing	   work,	   we	   suggest	   that	   the	   following	   conditions	   are	   necessary	   for	  
companies	   to	  engage	   in	   the	   type	  of	   transnational	   lobbying	  described	  here.	   Firstly,	   the	   firm	   in	  
question	   must	   be	   confronted	   with	   both	   a	   policy	   measure	   that	   poses	   a	   serious	   threat	   to	   its	  
material	   interests	  and	  high	  expected	  adjustment	  costs.	   	  As	  Lawton	  and	  McGuire	  have	  pointed	  
out,	   there	   are	   several	   potential	   adjustment	   strategies	   available	   to	   companies	   in	   response	   to	  
trade	  policy	  changes,	  but	   the	   feasibility	  of	   these	   strategies	  varies	  extensively	  across	   industrial	  
sectors.
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   The	   likelihood	   of	   political	   action	   is	   particularly	   high	   when	   adjustment	   options	   are	  
limited	  and	  firms	  thus	  face	  high	  costs	  from	  policy	  change.
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A	   second	   key	   reason	   for	   transnational	   lobbying,	   highlighted	   in	   Table	   2,	   is	   that	   the	   home	  
government	  is	  unresponsive	  to	  company	  demands.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  firms	  are	  seen	  as	  less	  
important	  for	  the	  domestic	  economy	  than	  more	  productive	  firms.	  Retailers	  are	  a	  good	  example,	  
as	   they	   are	   often	   seen	   to	   be	   less	   economically	   valuable	   than	  manufacturers.
116
	   As	   discussed	  
above,	  EU	  footwear	  retailers	  resorted	  to	  transnational	  CPA	  in	  the	  footwear	  case	  for	  exactly	  this	  
reason.	   The	   other	   key	   reason	  we	   identify	   for	   a	   potential	   lack	   of	   political	   leverage	   is	   that	   the	  
firms	   in	   question	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   morally	   suspect	   (i.e.	   “sin”	   industries).Gambling	   and	  
tobacco	   firms	  are	   clear	  examples	   	   and	   their	   transnational	   lobbying	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  gambling	  
and	   PP	   cases	   discussed	   above.	   	   Especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   such	   ‘sin’	   companies,	   their	   main	  
challengers	   in	   policy	   disputes	   are	   not	   competitor	   companies,
117
	   but	   civil	   society	   actors	   like	  
NGOs,	   doctors,	   religious	   groups	   and	   academics.	   The	   extensive	   mobilization	   of	   civil	   society	  
against	   them	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere	   undermines	   their	   chances	   of	   securing	   political	   support.	  
Seeking	  such	  support	  in	  a	  less	  conflictual	  environment	  –	  through	  transnational	  lobbying	  –	  is	  the	  
most	   rational	   strategy,	   particularly	   if	   the	   objective	   is	   to	   access	   the	   international	   trade	  
governance	   regime.	   Although	   this	   trend	   is	   most	   evident	   for	   ‘sin’	   companies,	   the	   growing	  
political	   power	   of	   NGOs	   also	   has	   implications	   for	   companies	   with	   less	   obvious	   negative	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externalities,	  like	  increased	  pollution	  or	  obesity.
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  Thus	  in	  the	  wider	  CPA	  sphere,	  it	  seems	  likely	  
that	  we	  will	   see	   increasing	   cases	  of	   conflicts	  on	   regulatory	   issues	  which	  pitch	   companies,	  not	  
against	   each	   other,	   but	   against	   civil	   society	   actors,	   with	   consequences	   for	   their	   political	  
influence.
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Thirdly,	   the	   companies	   in	   question	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   overcome	   collective	   action	   problems,	  
identify	  a	  legal	  line	  of	  attack	  and	  access	  the	  policy-­‐making	  machinery	  in	  a	  foreign	  country.	  None	  
of	  these	  is	  straightforward	  to	  achieve.	  International	  CPA	  for	  WTO	  action	  is	  even	  more	  time	  and	  
resource	   consuming	   than	   traditional	   dispute	   initiation	   	   through	  domestic	   CPA.	  Only	   the	  most	  
internationalized	  firms,	  operating	  in	  well-­‐endowed	  sectors,	  with	  a	  high	  concentration	  ratio	  and	  
a	  high	  mobilization	  rate	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  a	  strategy.
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6	  	   Contributions,	  limitations,	  and	  future	  research	  
In	   this	   paper	   we	   address	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   globalization	   of	   production	   networks	   and	  
expanded	  trade	  governance	  has	  impacted	  on	  CPA.	  We	  draw	  on	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  trade	  conflicts	  	  
to	  identify	  several	  changes	  in	  CPA	  in	  the	  international	  trade	  policy	  arena,	  which	  we	  believe	  are	  	  
strategic	  responses	  to	  the	  globalization	  of	  production	  and	  the	  expansion	  in	  coverage,	  as	  well	  as	  
complexity,	   of	   the	   international	   trade	   governance	   regime.	   In	   doing	   so,	   we	   contribute	   to	   the	  
literature	  which	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  CPA	  adapts	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  environment.
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Firstly	   by	   highlighting	   how,	   as	   trade	   and	   investment	   liberalization	   has	   facilitated	   cross-­‐border	  
integration	   of	   production	   networks,	   the	   range	   of	   ‘domestic’	   companies	   that	   get	   involved	   in	  
trade	   politics	   has	   expanded.	   In	   particular,	   import-­‐dependent	   firms	   have	   become	   increasingly	  
active.	   Secondly,	   we	   find	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	   global	   and	   multi-­‐level	   governance	   of	   trade	  
policy	   has	   led	   to	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   targets	   of	   CPA.	   Transnational	   lobbying	   activities	   and	   political	  
activity	  outside	  the	  home	  country	  have	  become	  more	  common,	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  objective	  
of	  accessing	   the	  WTO	  DSB,	  but	  also	   to	   fight	   (regional)	  protectionism.	  Finally,	  we	  also	  note	  an	  
increase	   in	   transnational	  advocacy	  by	  NGOs,	  who	  seek	   to	   impact	  on	   the	  governance	  of	  GVCs,	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both	  in	  cooperation	  with	  MNEs	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  them.	  We	  have	  argued	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
these	  evolutions,	  the	  positions	  of	  companies,	  NGOs	  and	  even	  states	  on	  important	  trade	  issues	  
can	   only	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   complex	   interlinkages	   which	   characterize	   the	  
contemporary	  world	  economy	  and	  the	  shared	  interests	  they	  create.	  	  
The	   main	   objective	   of	   this	   paper	   has	   been	   to	   better	   integrate	   these	   interactions	   into	   the	  
conceptual	   bases	   of	   international	   CPA,	   by	   revising	   Baron’s	   framework	   developed	   in	   the	  
1990s.
122
	   Clearly	   not	   all	   aspects	   of	   our	   revised	   framework	   are	   pertinent	   in	   any	   given	   trade	  
dispute.	  We	  recognize	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  firms	  still	  lobby	  their	  domestic	  government	  to	  further	  
their	   interests.	   However,	   we	   highlight	   several	   factors	   which	   are	   likely	   to	   stimulate	   MNEs	   to	  
engage	  in	  such	  novel	  and	  ‘transnational’	  CPA.	  In	  so	  doing,	  we	  expand	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
motivations	  for	  company	  CPA,	  a	  key	  concern	  in	  the	  literature.
123
	  We	  hope	  that	  our	  framework	  
will	  help	  trade	  policy	  scholars	  to	  better	  illuminate	  the	  role	  of	  different	  actors	  and	  their	  alliances	  
and	  more	  effectively	  analyze	  how	  final	  policy	  outcomes	  reflect	  these	  dynamics.	  In	  addition,	  we	  
see	  several	  promising	  avenues	   for	   future	  research	  based	  on	  the	  revised	  framework	  presented	  
here,	  both	  focusing	  on	  the	  trade	  policy	  arena	  and	  on	  CPA	  in	  other	  issue	  areas	  affected	  by	  global	  
integration.	  	  
Firstly,	  we	  see	  potential	   in	  work	  exploring	  how	  MNEs	  choose	  the	  political	  arena	   in	  which	  they	  
play	  out	  the	  policy	  conflicts	  which	  they	  seek	  to	  resolve.	   In	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  
multilateral	  (WTO)	  and	  regional	  (EU)	  level.	  Although	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  CPA	  
at	  this	  international	  level	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  expand,
124
	  the	  complexity	  and	  dynamic	  nature	  
of	   such	   institutions,	   particularly	   at	   multilateral	   level,	   also	   make	   outcomes	   there	   quite	  
uncertain.
125
	  This	  limits	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  this	  level	  as	  a	  venue	  for	  resolving	  disputes.	  MNEs	  
need	  to	  make	  choices	  on	  how	  to	  allocate	  scare	  corporate	  resources	  across	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  
potential	   operations,	   which	   implies	  making	   judgments	   on	  what	   level	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   the	  most	  
productive.
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  We	  know	   little	  about	  the	  driving	   factors	  behind	  these	  choices.	   In	   this	  paper	  we	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have	  highlighted	  some	  characteristics	  likely	  to	  encourage	  MNEs	  to	  undertake	  transnational	  CPA,	  
however	  more	  work	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   to	   better	   understand	   the	  motivating	   and	   constraining	  
factors	  behind	  such	  strategies.	  	  
Secondly,	  as	  shown	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  emergence	  of	  GVCs	  has	  had	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  
type	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  policy	  debates,	  their	  policy	  preferences	  and	  the	  incentives	  they	  face	  
when	   deciding	   to	   mobilize	   politically.	   Ultimately,	   we	   believe	   that	   GVCs	   also	   impact	   on	   how	  
public	  and	  private	  actors	  interact	  to	  produce	  particular	  policy	  outcomes.	  However,	  more	  work	  is	  
needed	   that	   systematically	   investigates	   the	   implications	   of	  GVCs	   for	   CPA.	   It	   is	   clear	   from	  our	  
analysis	   that	   the	   fact	   that	  many	   companies	   are	   now	  embedded	   in	   transnational	  GVCs	  means	  
that	   their	  most	   likely	   corporate	   partners	   for	   CPA	  may	   be	   found,	   not	   in	   their	   domestic	   trade	  
associations,	   but	   in	   their	   partners	   along	   the	   value	   chain.	   In	   the	   footwear,	   gambling	   and	   solar	  
cases	   discussed	   in	   this	   paper,	   we	   witnessed	   the	   establishment	   of	   cross	   border	   ad-­‐hoc	   lobby	  
groups	   specifically	   set	   up	   as	   vectors	   for	   CPA	   on	   the	   case	   in	   question.	   Such	   temporary,	   single	  
issue	   structures	   have	   provided	   important	   conduits	   for	   cooperative	   lobbying	   in	   several	   recent	  
cases,	  expanding	  the	  ‘coverage’	  of	  the	  coalition,
127
	  while	  challenging	  traditional	  ideas	  about	  the	  
necessary	  preconditions	  for	  collective	  action.	  	  
Thirdly,	   the	   expanding	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   policy-­‐making	   creates	   both	   new	   threats	   and	  
opportunities	   for	   MNEs.	   NGOs	   have	   been	   seen	   to	   be	   very	   effective	   at	   mobilizing	   around	  
regulatory	   issues	   at	   national	   and	   international	   level,	   including	   on	   issues	   indirectly	   related	   to	  
trade	  policy	   like	  public	  health
128
	   and	   sustainable	  production	   systems,
129
	   as	  well	   as	  directly	  on	  
trade	   policy	   itself.
130
	   In	   the	   cases	   explored	   here,	   NGOs	   have	   impacted	   on	  MNE	   CPA	   both	   by	  
campaigning	   against	   company	   interests	   (gambling	   and	   tobacco)	   and	   in	   their	   support	   (solar	  
panels).	  CPA	  theory	  thus	  needs	  to	  expand	  its	  focus	  from	  a	  traditional	  view,	  where	  governments	  
are	  the	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  to	  better	  incorporate	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  
MNEs	   often	   interact	  with	  NGOs	   in	   their	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   (CSR)	   actions,	   but	   this	  
work	   is	   frequently	   divorced	   from,	   and	   even	   incoherent	   with,	   their	   CPA	   activities.	   Several	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scholars	  have	  recently	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  problematic	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  MNEs	  
to	   better	   reconcile	   these	   two	   non-­‐market	   activities.
131
	   Such	   efforts	   would	   also	   increase	   the	  
potential	  to	  build	  alliances.	  However,	  beyond	  their	  CSR	  activities,	  very	  little	  work	  has	  addressed	  
how	  companies	  can	  more	  effectively	  work	  transnationally	  with	  civil	  society	  to	  achieve	  common	  
interests.	  There	  is	  certainly	  potential	  for	  further	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  
Finally,	  recent	  changes	  in	  the	  international	  political	  climate,	  especially	  Brexit	  and	  the	  US	  election	  
outcome,	   pose	   questions	   for	   the	   continued	   integration	   of	   both	   GVCs	   and	   trade	   governance.	  
Brexit	  will	  pose	  challenges	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  remove	  an	  important	  advocate	  of	  trade	  openness	  from	  
the	  Union.
132
	  The	  Trump	  administration	  has	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  WTO	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   rulings	   against	   new	   trade	   restrictions.
133
	   Such	  evolutions	  highlight	   that	  protectionist	   forces	  
continue	   to	   mobilize	   strong	   political	   support,	   posing	   major	   problems	   for	   globally	   integrated	  
MNEs	  and	  requiring	  them	  to	  continually	  readjust	  their	  CPA,	  revising	  alliances	  and	  targets.	  This	  
paper	  underlines	  the	  fact	  that	  CPA	  evolves	  in	  reaction	  to	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  created	  
by	   the	   institutional	   environment.	  We	   expect	   this	   evolution	   to	   continue	   in	   response	   to	   future	  
changes,	  requiring	  scholars	  to	  regularly	  adjust	  their	  understanding	  of	  how	  CPA	  is	  best	  structured	  
and	  organized.	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